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This research paper discusses the recent New Zealand experience of Military Activity Camps (MACs) through 
the implementation of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Youth Courts Jurisdictions and 
Orders) Amendment Act 2010. The paper will address the fundamental principles of the youth justice system 
under the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 and how the Amendment Act 2010 has created 
new possibilities of dealing with New Zealand’s most persistent group of young offenders. It will furthermore 
address the historic background of boot camps and aims to analyse how effective the introduction of MACs has 
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In almost every country around the world, legislators and policy makers are challenged with 
the task of creating an effective legal framework for young people in conflict with the law. 
The special nature of youth crime and the individual needs of young offenders require careful 
and flexible handling by the law.1 For the past 21 years New Zealand has been a vanguard 
and role model in terms of presenting the right “manual” on how to deal with young 
offenders. With the enactment of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act in 
1989 (CYPF Act), it has created a unique framework with revolutionary approaches that 
inspired many legal systems internationally2 and gained prominence due to its divergence to 
the “punitive populist adult criminal system”3. In 2008 however, New Zealand’s newly 
elected centre-right National Party made some significant changes to these existing laws.4  
With the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Youth Courts Jurisdictions and 
Orders) Amendment Act 2010 the new policy of Military Activity Camps (MACs) was 
introduced as part of the supervision with residence order5 in order to deal with the most 
serious young criminals. The history of failures of juvenile boot camps in New Zealand and 
even more conspicuous in the United States, contributed to controversial discussions 
predicting poor outcomes before the policy even came into force.6 After three years of 
practical experience with MACs the question arises if the policy succeeded in holding this 
group of offenders to account and reduce recidivism.  
This paper is divided into four parts. First, it will give an overview of the current picture of 
youth crime in New Zealand and will address the related legal frameworks. Second, it will 
describe the method of boot camps by exploring its origins and development. Third, the 
concept and policy behind MACs will be described and current statistics will be critically 
assessed. Finally, a variety of alternative approaches will be introduced and evaluated against 
common benchmarks for youth justice. It is contended that MAC’s in New Zealand have 
achieved their aim of being different from former boot camps and current results look 
promising. However, the success of the programme is found not to be driven by its 
militaristic elements. 
II. New Zealand’s youth justice system 
A. Youth crime and appearance in New Zealand 
 
In every society we can find the phenomenon of youth offending and similar patterns of 
behaviour are observable. Unlike adult crime “most youth violence is committed under the 
influence of alcohol and is random, spontaneous, gratuitous street violence, usually 
                                                             
1 This was also recognised by the United Nations that request their signing parties to implement a separate 
justice system for young offenders in Article 40 (b) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC) which was signed by New Zealand in 1993. 
2 Andrew Becroft “Are there Lessons to be Learned from the Youth Justice System?” (2009) 5 PQ 8 at 9. 
3 Nessa Lynch “Playing catch-up? Recent reform of New Zealand’s youth Justice system” (2012) 12 CCJ 507 at 
508. 
4 Nessa Lynch Youth Justice in New Zealand (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2012) at 18. 
5 CYPF Act, s 311(2). 
6 Lynch, above n 3, at 18. 
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committed by small groups of young men”7. While on one hand, we usually experience these 
break-outs as minor crimes that are led by premature behaviour and ideally die away as 
young persons mature into adulthood8, serious and violent juvenile offending on the other 
hand, can be a predictor for adult criminality.9  
The reason behind youth offending is so complex and linked to so many different conditions 
that we may not explain it by applying one single scientific theory. Researchers group their 
youth delinquency theories into sociological, psychological and biological categories, all 
together drawing a picture of risk factors that increase the probability of delinquent 
behaviour.10 The most dominant ones amongst them are: unstable family backgrounds, living 
in disadvantaged communities, contact with antisocial peers, substance abuse, exposure to 
violence and mental health problems.11 Usually more than one of these risk factors will be 
inherent in the young offender’s life, but the more factors collide, the higher the risk that 
these young individuals may not turn their back on crime by the time they grow up.12 In New 
Zealand we can currently observe such a group of persistent young offenders that, whilst 
being very small in number, commit nearly half of all youth crime in the country.13 Typical 
for the picture of youth crime in New Zealand is also the over-representation of young Māori 
in the youth justice system.14 This reveals the difficulties brought by the historic background 
of colonisation - the assimilation of the indigenous population.15 Lately, these facts have 
triggered moral panics about increased youth offending in the country, creating an overall 
incorrect impression that we are experiencing dramatic changes in this sector. Statistics prove 
perceptions to be wrong for the majority of young people in conflict with the law16 as 
apprehension rates are the lowest in 20 years and the number of young offenders appearing in 
court have decreased by 18 per cent since 2011/12.17 Children (under the age of 14 years) and 
young persons (over the age of 14 years but under 17 years) make up less than three per cent 
of the entire population charged in New Zealand’s courts.18 But since apprehension rates for 
violent crimes are still increasing (for all age groups), the youth justice community remains 
concerned.19 
 
                                                             
7 Becroft, above n 2, at 14. 
8 Gabriele Maxwell “Youth offenders: who, what and why” (9 November 2012) Te Ara  <www.teara.govt.nz> 
at 1. 
9 Susan Tarolla and others “Understanding and treating juvenile offenders: A review of current knowledge and 
future directions” (2002) 7 Aggress Violent Beh 125 at 128. 
10 Ross Gordon Green and Kearney Healy Tough on Kids (Purich Publishing Ltd., Saskatoon, 2003) at 60. 
11 The Ministry of Social Development Evaluation Report for the Military-style Activity Camp (MAC) 
programme (The Ministry of Social Development, Report, September 2013) at 20. 
12 Linda Zampese When the bough breaks: A literature based intervention strategy for young offenders 
(Department of Corrections, Literature Review, 1998) at 43. 
13 The Ministry of Social Development Report: The Fresh Start reforms in operation (Ministry of Social 
Development, July 2011) at 1. 
14 Making up 54 per cent, Ministry of Justice Child and Youth Prosecution – trends for 2012/13 (Ministry of 
Justice, Report, June 2013). 
15 Similar problems can be detected in Canada; Green and Healy, above n 10, at 118. 
16 Maxwell, above n 8, at 1. 
17 Ministry of Justice, above n 13.  
18 Ministry of Justice, above n 13. 
19 Andrew Becroft, Principal Youth Court Judge of New Zealand “What causes youth crime, and what can we 
do about it?” (NZ Bluelight Ventures Inc – Conference & AgM, Queenstown, 7 May 2009) at 2-3. 
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B. The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 
1. Background information 
 
In 1989 the pioneering CYPF Act was introduced responding to defects within the previous 
framework of the Children and Young Persons Act 1974 which combined a welfare and 
justice approach20 towards youth crime.21 The main problems which had been experienced in 
similar jurisdictions internationally included the overuse of police power, resulting in the 
decreased possibility of rehabilitating offenders.22 The new model was designed to develop 
community alternatives to institutions, to respond more effectively to the needs of victims, to 
provide better support for families and their children, to respond to the demands from Māori 
for an increased involvement of decisions about their children, and to reduce the number of 
minor offenders appearing before the court.23 The recipe for success was the restorative 
justice approach towards youth crime providing “a comprehensive set of general principles 
that govern both state intervention in the lives of children and young people and the 
management of the youth justice system”24.25 
 
2. Framework and schemes 
 
The framework of the CYPF Act targets young offenders above the age of ten since this is the 
threshold of criminal responsibility in New Zealand.26 It offers a variety of schemes in order 
to deal with youth offending in an efficient way whilst addressing the young person’s needs. 
Alongside the possibilities to remain inactive in the case of minor offences and dealing with 
very serious cases in front of the Youth Court, the most prominent scheme is the handling of 
offences through the Youth Aid system that includes Police Youth Diversion and family 
group conferences (FGC).27 Derived from indigenous practices28, the latter “lies at the heart 
of the New Zealand procedures”29 as it provides the opportunity to deal with the young 
person outside the court room. It aims at mediating responsibility and repairing the damage in 
an educative manner. In practice this involves an apology of the offender, undertaking work 
for the victim or paying reparation.30 This reflects the intention of New Zealand’s system to 
                                                             
20 Allison Morris and Warren Young Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Institute of 
Criminology of Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 1987) at 3. 
21 Lynch, above n 4, at 10. 
22 Nessa Lynch “Contrasts in Tolerance in a Single Jurisdiction: The Case of New Zealand” (2013) 23 Int'l Crim 
Just Rev 217 at 221.  
23 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris “Youth Justice in New Zealand: Restorative Justice in Practice?” 
(2006) 62 J. Soc. Issues 239 at 242. 
24 The Ministry of Social Development Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice (The Ministry of Social 
Development, Final Report, February 2004) at 7. 
25 CYPF Act 1989, s 4. 
26 The Ministry of Social Development, above n 24, at 15; Crimes Act 1961, ss 22, 21.  
27 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris Family, victims and culture: Youth Justice in New Zealand (Social 
Policy Agency and Institute of Criminology Victoria University of Wellington, Research Report Series No 14, 
1993) at 9. 
28 Kathleen Daly “Conferencing in Australia and New Zealand” Allison Morris and Gabrielle Maxwell (ed) 
Restorative Justice for Juveniles: Conferencing, Mediation & Circles (Hart Publishing Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon, 2001) 59 at 65. 
29 The Ministry of Social Development, above n 24, at 16. 
30 Maxwell and Morris, above n 27, at 92. 
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share the responsibility for the young person’s offending with families, whanau, hapu, iwi 
and family groups.31 
After more than twenty years of practical experience with the CYPF Act, its success has been 
proven in terms of holding young offenders accountable for their actions, while at the same 
time drawing attention to their care and protection. Today, the major strengths still lie in the 
diversionary approach to young suspects that are responsible for the decreasing rates of 
imprisonment.32  
 
C. The Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Youth Courts Jurisdiction and 
Orders) Amendment Act 2010 
 
On the 8th of November 2008, the centre-right National Party won the largest share of votes 
and seats in the election for New Zealand’s 49th Parliament after a campaign that had strongly 
focussed on youth offending. The campaign was of great success as it seemed to present the 
solution for the allegedly increasing youth crime, propagandized as “tomorrow’s crises”33. 
The “first 100 Days” programme34 run by the parliamentary leader John Key involved the 
implementation of the CYPF Amendment Act 2010, being the first modification of the CYPF 
Act 1989 since 21 years.35 It aimed to implement pre-election promises introducing the Fresh 
Start Reforms36; a “robust framework for providing programmes based on research, 
monitoring and evaluation”37. Targeting the worst 1,000 youth offenders in New Zealand, the 
concept intended to offer more severe and intensive treatments for those criminals.38 
Although the current laws were seen to be dealing well with the majority of youth offenders 
and protective factors such as “victim participation, non-politicization and practitioner 
attitude”39 had shielded the system from punitive alterations until now, changes were about to 
be made. Minister Paula Bennett was convinced that: 
 “The youth justice sector called for more options to deal with a hard-core group of 
young offenders.”40 
As a direct response, the reforms covered changes to the Supervision with Activity and the 
Supervision with Residence (SwR) orders, measures that enabled mentoring, parenting 
education and specific rehabilitation programmes and the extension of the jurisdiction of the 
Youth Court to deal with the most serious 12 and 13 year old offenders.41 One of the most 
                                                             
31 Maxwell and Morris, above n 23, at 245. 
32 Becroft, above n 2, at 11. 
33 John Key, Leader of the Opposition “2008: A Fresh Start for New Zealand” (State of the Nation speech, 29 
January 2008). 
34 John Key “Delivering on Our Election Promises: Our First 100 days” (2009) National Party 
<www.national.org.nz>. 
35 Lynch, above n 4, at 18. 
36 Lynch, above n 4, at 19; John Key, Leader of the Opposition “2008: A Fresh Start for New Zealand” (State of 
the Nation speech, 29 January 2008). 
37 Ministry of Social Development, above n 13, at 2. 
38 Paula Bennett “A Fresh Start for young offenders” (16 February 2009) Beehive <www.beehive.govt.nz> at 1. 
39 Lynch, above n 4, at 513. 
40 Paula Bennett “Fresh Start Reforms in operation: a progress report” (20 July 2011) Beehive 
www.beehive.govt.nz>. 
41 The Ministry of Social Development Reduced re-offending by young people (The Ministry of Social 
Development, Annual Report, 2010/2011) at 1; see also Andrew Becroft and others Youth Justice practice 
issues – an update (New Zealand Law Society CLE Ltd, October 2012) at 17. 
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significant new approaches was yet the possibility to send offenders to Military Activity 
Camps as part of the SwR order.42 The policy aimed to introduce an innovative approach to 
hold young people responsible for their criminal actions while at the same time decreasing 
the imposed risk for the community. 
III. Boot Camps  
A. Origin and development of boot camps 
 
To some extent the idea of boot camps and their use as a penal sanction for criminals evolved 
from the constantly changing face of the correctional system. 
“The best metaphor for characterizing the past 150 years of correctional policies is the 
proverbial pendulum that swings back and forth between liberal and conservative 
ideologies and practices.”43 
In the pursue to alter criminal patterns, methods reached from one extreme to the other, either 
being immensely punitive what resulted in high incarceration rates, or being very lenient in 
the treatment of criminals.  
For most of the post-war period an accelerating crime boom could be observed, enabling the 
phenomenon of penal populism to emerge from the 1970s onwards.44 This is a process 
whereby politicians become increasingly involved in the discussion about criminal justice 
and promise a get-tough response on crime in order to win votes. The success and popularity 
of these punitive election pledges were thankfully accepted by a society that had become 
sensitised to crime and welcomed any proactive stance towards this issue.45 Additionally, 
fuelled by excessive media reports on the danger of “crime running out of control” a 
foundation was laid for a new era of punitiveness; restructuring penal powers.  
Towards the end of the 1970s when juvenile correctional systems everywhere around the 
world had been harshly criticised for not being able to rehabilitate and prevent young 
offenders from reoffending, the idea of “getting tough” was appealing. In the course of this 
“nothing works”46 movement, researchers, policy makers and service providers desperately 
searched for new methods that would actually work. Once again, instead of approaching the 
problem in a rehabilitative way, it was concluded it would be more promising to focus on 
punishment, deterrence and retribution. Especially utilitarian philosophers were convinced 
that the only cure for persistent offenders was incarceration until the negative behavioural 
patterns subsided naturally.47 This “get-tough” response towards youth crime soon led to the 
American innovation of boot camps in the 1980s and 1990s which had at first been targeted 
                                                             
42 CYPF Act 1989, s 311. 
43 Brent B. Benda “Introduction: Boot Camps Revisited: Issues, Problems, Prospects” (2005) 40 J Offender 
Rehabil 1 at 7. 
44 John Pratt ”When Penal Populism Stops: Legitimacy, Scandal and the Power to Punish in New Zealand” 
(2008) 41 ANZJ Crim 364 at 367. 
45 Kübra Gültekin and Sebahattin Gültekin “Is juvenile boot camp policy effective?“ (2012) 9 Int J Human Sc 
725 at 726. 
46 See Jalal Shamsie “Anti-social Adolescents: Our Treatments Do Not Work – Where Do We Go from Here?” 
(1981) 26 Can J Psychiatry 357 at 357. 
47 Benda, above n 43, at 9. 
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at adult offenders and were part of the intermediate sanctions concept.48 Intermediate 
sanctions were to serve as a form of punishment between prison and probation, offering 
judges more options that would eventually lead to more just sentencing.49 The aim of boot 
camps to reduce recidivism, decrease incarceration rates and limit costs “used a language that 
promised a toughness that resonated with the prevailing political climate”50 and appeared as 
the ideal way out of the crisis with youth offending.51 The revolutionary concept offered a 
non-traditional alternative to the deprecated correctional facilities, yet picked up on former 
conventional disciplinary methods that were found in parenting practises from the 1920s to 
the 1960s.52 Although modern parenting practice had apostatised from these approaches, they 
seemed to be an appropriate measure in a criminal environment.  
 
B. Concept and practice of boot camps 
 
With the opening of the first correctional boot camp for juveniles in Louisiana (USA) in 
198553 a flood of militaristic facilities followed in many other countries around the world. 
The new institutions followed the model of military training, characterized by routine, 
discipline, physical labour and academic education.54 The explicit goal of all military 
activities being to “break”55 the young offender in order to rebuild him and enduringly 
change his antisocial behaviour, also known as the “shock incarceration method”.56 Boot 
camps for young offenders proliferated in many directions, including a variety of different 
models. They ranged from “military drilling style camps” which primarily focussed on 
discipline and “rehabilitative camps” with emphasis on reintegrating the offender, to 
“educational/vocational camps” where schooling made up a major part of the programme.  
Although the idea of changing young criminals through short-term shock incarceration 
appeared to be a successful method at first, statistics57 soon revealed that recidivism rates had 
not decreased and boot camps were actually more costly than existing models such as 
juvenile probation and supervision programmes.58 After alarming and continuous reports 
about younger children being physically and psychologically abused in camps in the United 
                                                             
48 Nicholas Bala and Sanjeev Anand Youth Criminal Justice Law (2nd ed, Irwin Law Inc., Toronto, 2009) at 
591-592; see also William Bourns and Carol Veneziano and Louis Veneziano “A study of criminal justice 
policy makers’ perspectives: The forgotten component in boot camp programs and goals” (2005) 33 JCJ 113 at 
114. 
49 Francis Cullen and others “The Rise and Fall of Boot Camps” (2005) 40 J Offender Rehabil 53 at 56. 
50 Cullen and others, above n 49, at 58. 
51 Tim Hall and Linda McIver “Principal Youth Court Judge’s Newsletter Issue 42” (April 2009) The Youth 
Court of New Zealand <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
52 Cyndi Banks Youth, Crime and Justice (Routhledge, Abindon, 2013) at 268. 
53 The first correctional boot camps for adults were set up in Georgia and Oklahoma (US) two years earlier. 
54 Leia De Vita “Statistically Speaking: Do Alternative Punishments Work? – A Comparison of Boot Camp 
Punishment and Traditional Facilities” (2010) 30 Child Legal Rts. J 76 at 76. 
55 Rethinking Crime and Punishment “’To Boot or not to Boot' - A Key Response to Youth Offending” 
<www.rethinking.org.nz> at 1. 
56 Benjamin Meade and Benjamin Steiner “The total effects of boot camps that house juveniles: A systematic 
review of evidence” (2010) 38 JRJ 841 at 842. 
57 A study in Florida in 1997 showed recidivism rates from 63 to 74 per cent, see Jerry Tyler and Ray Darville 
and Kathi Stalnaker “Juvenile boot camps: a descriptive analysis of program diversity and effectiveness” (2001) 
38 SOC SCI J 445 at 449. 
58 Tyler and Darville and Stalnaker, above n 57, at 450. 
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States resulting in deaths59, criticism got louder. Suddenly boot camps were no longer 
regarded as problem free and the picture of “camp fear”60 led to a sharp decline of usage.61 
Surprisingly, despite this relapse, the concept of boot camps remained proportionally popular. 
Today the new generation of camps still concentrates on military drills; however, educational 
goals dominate over sole punishment.62 Governmental institutions aim at offenders inside the 
criminal justice system, while private institutes also offer programmes for troubled children 
that are likely to get in conflict with the law.63   
IV. Military Activity Camps (MACs) in New Zealand 
A. Background information 
 
The incorporation of MACs in New Zealand was part of the many promises that were given 
by the National Party during their election campaign in 2008. The CYPF Amendment Bill 
2009 proposed the set-up of militaristic camps, reflecting the punitive approach towards 
youth crime that had been one of the elementary components leading to the Party’s election 
success. Yet this shining example of penal populism wasn’t a new experience for New 
Zealand; it had already proven in the past to approach the justice system in a similarly 
punitive way. This becomes obvious when looking at the adult criminal system and the high 
prison rates which are currently at 192 per 100,000 of population for the year 2013.64 The 
causes for this “populist punitiveness” have been intensively discussed in academia. The 
most convincing drivers identified by Pratt and Clark for New Zealand are the existence of “a 
homogenous society and (more recently) neoliberalism, and the cumulative effect of populist 
lobby groups, a crime-obsessed media and the politicization of crime, particularly 
victimization.”65 However, this phenomenon is not a unique feature of New Zealand. Already 
Margaret Thatcher won the British elections in 1979 after promising “short sharp shock” 
detention centres for young offenders66 and Australia’s recently elected Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott increased his chances of success by promising to get tough on gun crime.67  
Despite the identified fact that it was easy for the National Party to sell their punitive 
intentions to the public, it is surprising that the voters found the idea of MACs appealing 
since New Zealand had unsuccessfully used a similar sentence between 1981 and 2002. 
“Corrective Trainings”, targeting 15 to 20 year old youth offenders, were introduced to 
replace the sentences of detention in a detention centre and borstal training.68 Unlike most 
American models that commonly focussed on pure physical labour, the institutions in New 
Zealand varied in their physical layout depending on their local possibilities. Most of the 
                                                             
59 Banks, above n 52, at 269; Michael Janofsky “States Pressed As 3 Boys Die At Boot Camps” The New York 
Times (online ed, United States, 15 July 2001). 
60 Bruce Selcraig “Camp fear” (November-December 2000) Mother Jones <www.motherjones.com>, at 64-71. 
61 Cullen and others, above n 49, at 65. 
62 Tyler and Darville and Stalnaker, above n 57, at 449. 
63 Qatsihs Coalition “Boot Camps Discussion Paper” (March 2011) <www.qatsihs.org.au> at 1. 
64 Prison Studies “World Prison Brief New Zealand” (June 2013) <www.prisonstudies.org>. 
65 John Pratt and Marie Clark “Penal populism in New Zealand” (2005) 7 Punishm Soc 303 at 304; see also 
Lynch, above n 22, at 218. 
66 Pratt, above n 44, at 367. 
67 Simon Benson “Tony Abbott to get tough on gun crime with proposal for mandatory minimum sentence of 
five years jail” The Daily Telegraph (online ed, NSW Australia, 19 August, 2013). 
68 Walton Walker and Robert Brown Corrective Training: An Evaluation (Planning and Development Division 
Department of Justice, Wellington, Study Series No. 10, December 1983) at 1. 
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daily routine was directed to a work programme outside for seven and a half hours per day, 
involving farming and working in the forests. The educational elements of these trainings 
were very limited and only occupied one and a half hours per day.69 The training’s main 
objective was “to reduce offending by the experience of a punitive but fair sentence”70. Yet 
after the reoffending rate of 92 per cent71 was revealed, the sentence of corrective training 
was abolished by the Sentencing Act 2002.  
 
B. Policy and aim behind MACs 
 
It has been discussed earlier in the paper that the perception of youth crime in New Zealand 
contradicts with the evidence on children and crime in the country. Generally we find that, 
not only in New Zealand but also for example in England, most policies dealing with youth 
crime are strongly linked to media hyperbole and electoral politics.72 Governments recognize 
that the public feels anxious and insecure when it comes to children involved in crime, and 
they sense their chances of electoral success by responding to this vulnerability with rigorous 
crime management. Youth crime “challenges our belief in childhood innocence – and, 
perhaps, some fundamental beliefs about the possibility of a ‘good society’. It generates fear 
of lawlessness and of the effects of a breakdown in socialisation. It questions the quality of 
our services for children, our support for parents and our investment in future generations.”73 
In the case of New Zealand the small group of offenders responsible for the majority of youth 
crime, provoked these fears once more and the government responded with stern measures to 
this public perception. To some extent it was intended that voters associate MACs with boot 
camps because the “image of offenders participating in military drill and hard physical labor 
make boot camps look demanding and unpleasant, characteristics that crime-conscious 
officials and voters find satisfying”74. However, this intention appears as a contradiction in 
terms as MACs were also advertised to be different from former boot camps. Anyhow, we 
find that the public’s blindness to evidence based policies evoked the new concept to a great 
extent. 
With regards to the aims of MACs we find that the concept falls strongly back on one of the 
original goals of boot camps, the reduction of reoffending rates. Decreasing costs and 
incarceration rates on the other hand were only regarded as a positive side effect and didn’t 
function as a purpose for the programme. Although reoffending is not an explicit objective75 
found in New Zealand’s justice system it had a high priority in the process of their 
establishment.76 By decreasing the offender’s probability of reoffending it was believed that 
                                                             
69 Walker and Brown, above n 68, at 8-9. 
70 Secretary for Justice to Prison Superintendents Circular PADM 6-1 Appendix I (Secretary for Justice to Prison 
Superintendents, 2 February 1981); Walker and Brown, above n 68, at 1.  
71Derek Cheng “Young offenders finish first military-style camp” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, 
Auckland, 25 February 2010).  
72 Derrick Armstrong “A Risky Business? Research, Policy, Governmentality and Youth Offending” (2004) 4 
YJ 100 at 100. 
73 Armstrong, above n 72, at 100. 
74 Michael Tonry Sentencing Matters (Oxford University Press, New York, 1998) at 110. 
75 It is only implied by ss 4, 5 CYPF Act. 
76 Gabrielle Maxwell “Alternatives to Prosecution for Young Offenders in New Zealand” T. Wing Lo and 
Dennis Wong and Gabrielle Maxwell (ed) Alternatives to prosecution: Rehabilitative and restorative models of 
youth justice (Marshall Cavendish International Private Limited, Singapore, 2005) 206 at 227. 
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youth crime could be actively controlled and thus would achieve and ensure community 
safety.77  
Moreover, the policy was brought in to improve on the effectiveness of current interventions. 
By giving the Youth Court the possibility to combine the SwR order with a specified 
programme78 such as the MAC, the roots of the offending of the young person were thought 
to be addressed more effectively. This flexibility was worshipped in the process of working 
together with young people especially because it offered a promising response to their 
multilateral needs.79 
Despite the policy aiming to get tough80 on youth crime, we also find that on the contrary, 
MACs encouraged to rehabilitate offenders and integrate them into the community. The 
precisely planned after care programme which follows the residential phase of the 
programme helped to “provide an environment where the young persons can improve their 
life circumstances, take responsibility for their own behaviour and live productive lives”81. 
Eventually this was thought to limit the urge of the offender to commit offences and lead to a 
sustainable transformation.  
New Zealand’s planners and practitioners referred back to many schemes discussed in the 
“‘What Works”82 literature in order to establish MACs. One of the most significant outcomes 
of this orientation83 was that the camps were to target the top end of youth offenders that 
might otherwise be transferred to the adult court system. MACs therefore were also 
established to offer a countermeasure to this problem. This intervention should especially 
prevent young criminals from coming into contact with the criminal energy present in adult 
prisons. This may contribute to further criminal activity and inhibit the young person’s 
development in an anyhow critical phase of their lives.   
Overall, MACs were therefore thought of as a “last resort” providing an “intensive 
wraparound support to the 40 most serious and persistent young male offenders each year to 
assist them to make pro-social choices (eg not reoffending) and ultimately make a successful 
transition to adulthood.”84  
 
C. Justification for implementation 
 
Because of the negative reports on the use of boots camps in the past, the new policy required 
justification. One of the convincing arguments in favour of the camps was that further 
investigations and research had indicated that when used in combination with treatment 
options camps could make a difference.85 A strong impetus towards MACs was also provided 
                                                             
77 Chris Polaschek “What worked, what didn’t and what don’t we know?” (Australasian Youth Justice 
Conference, Canberra, 20-22 May 2013) at 2. 
78 CYPF Act 1989, s 311(2). 
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by the great success of the “Limited Service Programme”86 (LSV), a motivation programme 
run by the New Zealand Defence Force for long-term young unemployed.87 This programme 
includes many outdoor activities, vocational training and counselling in order to encourage 
and enable young people to get a job after completing the programme. However, participants 
in the LSV aren’t criminals; they are unemployed and join the programme voluntarily.88 
Young persons in the MAC programme on the other hand have a much more difficult 
background. They have been in conflict with the law for a long time and most importantly 
MACs are a part of their sentence which is given by the Youth court. Although the young 
person’s consent to this certain activity is required, their freedom of decision is strongly 
undermined as the order remains a court sentence.  
At the whole, the concept of military programmes for troubled youths was considered the 
right strategy and had only failed in the past because of the lack of therapeutic interventions. 
Therefore it was emphasized that: 
“The camps are not like the old sentence of corrective training. They are a modern 
innovation incorporating army style discipline with cognitive behaviour treatment 
from experts.”89  
A lot more complex is the question why the public regarded or still regards MACs as an 
effective measure for treating young offenders, if these programmes have been proven to be 
ineffective more than once.90 At a first glance the dichotomy between scientific evidence and 
the public’s perception appears indecipherable. Simon attempts to explain the positive 
resonance of society towards “[the] return of military gestures in contemporary penal 
practices [as] an exercise in nostalgia”91. According to this observation, wilful nostalgia is a 
powerful factor that poles the human mind into a certain direction. In the case of boot camps 
many minds will associate “favourable impressions of the armed forces”92 often portrayed 
excessively by the media. Pictures involving juveniles crawling through mud and being 
shouted at by Drill Sergeants will most certainly come along with these thoughts.93 These 
visions are so appealing because they are perceived as an uncomfortable punishment that 
reminds one of old-school education techniques. Although today’s educational methods have 
shifted drastically from those in the past, as mentioned above already, the nostalgic taste in 
times where getting through to young people seems difficult, is convincing.  
Another factor may be that especially the older generation, which had been subject to 
compulsory military training under the Defence Act 190994 until 197295 will remember their 
time serving in the Army. They may recall this “experience as not necessarily pleasant but as 
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an effective way to learn self-discipline and to learn to work as part of a team”96 and 
therefore regard MACs as a proper fit for youth offenders.  
For one or the other reason, many will just imagine MACs as a place where young adults are 
kept busy so they do not have time to develop negative ideas leading to further crime.97 Being 
outdoors, experiencing nature is regarded as an efficient tool to confront troubled kids. On the 
contrary, the public will rarely consider the negative side effects of these facilities; neither 
will they give further thought into what will work best on the long run. 
 
D. Legal implementation 
 
The MACs were introduced with the enactment of the CYPF Amendment Act 2010. 
However, as part of the new SwR order under s 311(2) CYPF Act, they were not explicitly 
stated in the wording which enables their quick abolition without having to change the law 
itself. Since MACs are part of an SwR order, they don’t appear as a direct alternative to 
prison although some sort of custody98 is involved in the order. Nevertheless, a Judge may 
now use MACs as an alternative to transfer the offender to the adult court system under s 
283(o) CYPF Act which can eventually result in a prison sentence because the Sentencing 
Act 2002 applies. The suggestion for an order including MACs is therefore reserved for the 
top end of offenders which appear to be resistant to any other treatment. Furthermore s 290A 
CYPF Act applies according to s 311(2) CYPF Act, which ensures that the court does not 
impose the condition unless the residential component of the specified programme or activity 
is to be provided by one of the listed bodies.99 
As part of the CYPF Act and as a measure of New Zealand’s youth justice system, the 
programme had to comply with the principles of s 208 CYPF Act. Since MACs are 
considered a punitive measure in the correctional system, the government was forced to 
design camps that would not violate the non-punitive principles. Although it is almost 
impossible to unite all of these goals in one programme, concepts shall certainly not be 
contradictory to them.  
With respect to s 208 (fa) CYPF Act which states that “measures…should…address the 
causes underlying the child’s or young person’s offending”, we find that MACs focus very 
well on the underlying causes of the offending.100 As discussed above they can be an 
alternative to s 283(o) CYPF Act in many cases which therefore address s 208 (f)(ii). 
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E. Practical implementation 
 
MACs are delivered in partnership by CYF and the NZDF and are described as an “exiting 
package” by the Principal Youth Court Judge Becroft.102 Unlike past models, they were 
envisaged to consist of limited military components but with a strong focus on education 
aiming at a reduction of seriousness and frequency of reoffending.103 The residential time 
lasts up to nine weeks, including a five day wilderness camp, and focuses on physical and 
mental challenges. Unlike models in the United States that target minor criminals104, the local 
institutions concentrate on the most serious youth offenders. By aiming at a group which is 
not suitable for non-custodial sentences, the negative effects of net-widening105 may be 
obviated or at least reduced. In order to prevent exposure of younger offenders (below the age 
of 15) to high risks of abuse and bad influence of older inmates, the age parameter reaches 
from 15 to 17 years. The main contents of the programme include “goal-setting, exploring job 
or training opportunities, drug and alcohol treatment, and attending programmes to address 
their offending behaviour”106. After their release graduates are equipped with individual plans 
and must involve in an intensive after care programme as part of their supervision order 
lasting at least nine months.107 This part of the programme is crucial in the process to help 
reinforce and sustain the lessons they have learnt during their time in camp.108  
 




Three years after the implementation the question arises, how well the ”get-tough” response 
of the new government did in practise. Recent statistics about the programme can be used as 
an indicator for the success of MACs. 
The first official numbers were published in 2011 and showed that out of 17 participants only 
two had not reoffended since their release, producing a recidivism rate of approximately 88 
per cent. Out of all participants, four had been sent to prison since, 60 per cent had offended 
less seriously and 53 per cent had done so less frequently.109 
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In 2012 one could observe a similar picture. Out of 31 offenders who attended the camps, 
only 61 per cent had been found reoffending within the first six months of their release110 and 
63 per cent of the young people that reoffended did so at a lower frequency.111  
In the Report 2013, the Ministry of Social Development evaluates the reoffending rates in 
more detail, reviewing the programme between October 2010 and July 2013. As stated: nine 
MAC residential programmes were run with a total of 80 young people starting the 
programme and 70 of these completing it. Statistics from 2013 reveal a reoffending rate of 83 
per cent within 12 months of their release, 83 and 74 per cent, respectively, reducing their 




Before we evaluate the outcomes of MACs we need to acknowledge that it is still too early to 
deem camps efficient or inefficient since there has not been enough data yet113 and formal 
analysis will not take place until the end of 2014.114  
If we compare the most recent results of MACs to the numbers of non-MAC participants 
sentenced to a custodial order (SwR), we observe that reoffending rates are similar for this 
group being at 81 per cent. In comparison to the year 2011 they are even better.115 
Considering that “the average risk of reoffending for MAC participants is notably higher than 
for other male offenders”116, as they represent the top end of the serious criminals, these 
results can be rated as promising. Nevertheless, we still find that more than half of the 
participants are reoffending after their release. The primary goal of the camps has therefore 
only been achieved to a certain degree and we shouldn’t be satisfied with only little changes 
in this sector.  
The current evaluation report suggests to improve the selection and referral process as well as 
the community phase of MACs to achieve better outcomes while the residential phase has 
been found working well. Agreeing that the camp structure comprises of many elements that 
are producing good outcomes and are the result of a well-planned model, we may find room 
for further improvement that ensures that MACs fight recidivism properly in all phases. 
With regards to the camp structure it could be argued that the assigned nine month are not 
long enough to outweigh the negative past experiences the young person has made.117 If 
MACs are considered beneficial for the young offender there is no reason why the residential 
phase of the SwR order shouldn’t be extended. Instead of nine weeks, the residential phase 
could for example last up to six months. This would give the young persons more time to 
work on their risk factors in a safe environment and would further enable them to earn more 
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educational qualifications during their time in camp. Any additional competences they will 
gain will help to find them their place in the community after their release. 
Furthermore, the new concept doesn’t draw enough attention to the involvement of the 
offender’s family as required by the principle of s 208(c) CYPF Act. It is elementary for 
young people to be kept inside their community and to strengthen their family bonds as 
“parents play key roles in preventing recidivism of juveniles”118. This is an even more 
important goal when looking at the disproportional representation of young Māori in the 
justice system. Their cultural background requires very active involvement of the whanau, 
hapu and iwi as longitudinal studies have shown and is practised in Māori customary law.119 
Furthermore, a strong sense of Māori identity and the connection to their culture have been 
identified as protective factors that can prevent recidivism.120 There exist several methods by 
which the family could be integrated further into the programme, such as having regular 
family visiting hours and getting families involved in the child’s therapy programme.  
Moreover, “[stripping] down a person through regimentation, then send[ing] the offender 
home to an environment that is the exact opposite of the boot camp – formally unstructured 
and often lacking commanding directive for positive behaviour” can still be regarded as 
counterproductive as it deprives the young person of the chance to prepare for real life. 
Although it is important to mediate structure and routine, these elements shouldn’t be 
excessively exercised. It could be more beneficial to structure daily routine in a way that 
reflects a normal day of a non-delinquent young person (as far as possible), instead of a day 
spent in the Army because they won’t return to the latter. It is important to make sure that the 
offender understands why routine is exercised but also how they can transfer this knowledge 
into their lives after the camps. Intensifying lessons on autonomous behaviour and 
responsibility are therefore essential to make sure that the young person smoothly returns to 
life outside of MACs. 
A big issue contributing to the still too high reoffending rates is that graduating youths 
usually return to their pre-existing environments, making it difficult to sustain positive 
behavioural changes. It may be necessary to provide more assistance after their release, for 
example by helping them to enrol in schools, find a new job or accommodation in a different 
environment which is less criminogenic. It is also of great importance to educate and prepare 
the young person’s community and give them the chance to enforce their own ideas since 
they will be dealing with the offender in future.121 On-going support and encouragement will 
facilitate the reintegration process, requiring a “strong link between local, regional and 
national governance”122. This can be done by engaging the Justice sector (Police and 
Judiciary) in promoting ways to manage post residential supervision and support for the 
offender.123 
Another key factor identified by the “What Works” literature which could increase the 
chances of success of MACs is motivation. A young person that is willing to engage in the 
programme and shows commitment will certainly have better chances to rehabilitate than 
those with a negative attitude. By using a strategy called “motivational interviewing” the 
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social worker can function as a “change agent” or “role model”124 interactively engaging with 
the young person. To teach such techniques it is essential that social workers undergo specific 
trainings and update their knowledge on a regular basis.125 Introductory courses are usually 
not sufficient enough since working with young offenders requires more intensive training. 
The same applies for workers that are involved in carrying out the supervision order 
following MACs. To incentivise positive responses and behavioural changes of young 
offenders MACs will need to draw even more attention to this issue.126 
Overall, the evaluation report 2013 produced promising data with regards to the effectiveness 
of MACs in New Zealand. Besides the fact that MACs have proven to have positive effects 
on recidivism rates and led to less severe and frequent reoffending, there are still a range of 
options that could be considered to improve the concept further. We need to be aware though 
that the more rehabilitative measures we continue to implement, the more we will move away 
from the initial idea of MACs. Radical changes to the original boot camp concept behind 
MACs will mean that we are not providing a militaristic facility anymore but rather a 
therapeutic facility that involves physical labour. Consequently, the question will arise if we 
need “Military” Training Camps at all, or if we can’t simply maintain their general 
intervention scheme leaving out the military component. 
V. Alternative approaches 
A. Ineffective approaches 
 
If “MACs are the last ditch attempt, where we pull out all the stops to turn these kids around 
and stop them heading to adult prison”127, what do we do, if we don’t achieve the results we 
hoped for? Maybe there are less punitive measures that are more effective? To prevent a 
revival of the ”nothing works” era, it is important to reach out for further alternatives. In the 
past researchers have provided us with many other pathways, unfortunately not all could be 
considered as an effective alternative to MACs or traditional facilities. Programmes that 
operated on a “control-basis” such as the Scared Straight Programs in the 1970s, and 
Intensive Supervision Programs on Probation or on Parole were deemed inefficient at a very 
early stage. Lacking social-scientific principles and simply working on common sense 
perspectives has proven to be counter-productive since negative behavioural patterns are 
further strengthened.128  
 
B. Te Hurihanga Pilot Project (THPP) 
 
Lately, there have been several attempts in New Zealand to provide non-punitive but 
effective alternatives. Schemes such as the THPP, MYND Auckland, Canterbury Youth 
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Development, and Start Taranaki have demonstrated that alternatives may work if given the 
chance to.129  
The THPP, the most promising project of the above mentioned, was run by the Youth 
Horizon Trust in Hamilton and consisted of a three-phased therapeutic scheme targeted at 
young males, aged 14 to 16 years, who have appeared before the courts. It aimed to reduce 
recidivism, hold offenders accountable and provide tailored support so they “can make 
positive choices rather than continue on current (offending) pathways”130.  
The three phases of the programme consisted of a residential, a transition and a community 
phase. The first stage involved intensive monitoring in the residence for up to six months 
which focussed on engagement, stabilisation, motivation, education, cultural confidence and 
skill acquisition.131 It also strengthened family bounds by engaging them in the programme 
and educating them about interventions. We also find that there was a great focus on Tikanga 
Māori values, reflecting the principles of s 208(b) CYPF Act. When comparing this stage of 
the programme to the residential phase of the MAC programme we find that within the THPP 
the cultural background of the offender is more foregrounded than within the MAC, where 
the bicultural focus is usually limited to the Waanga and activities that include Māori 
language in the daily routine.132  
The task of the transition phase is to integrate the young person back into the midst of their 
communities offering possibilities to attend school and join community based activities. The 
supervision at this stage will be gradually reduced over time to guarantee an independent and 
smooth transition into the community phase of the programme.133 
Within the community phase the offender returns home, but receives assistance of THPP staff 
which is directed at the whaanau of the young person. The main aim is to “sustain a high 
level of supervision, accountability, behavioural expectations and appropriate parenting 
responses”134.  
As a result of this multilateral approach graduates were recorded to have committed either no 
offences, or they have reduced the severity and frequency of their offending.135 The reason 
for this success probably lay in the non-punitive concept of the programme. Especially the 
strong bond between the different phases and the focus on the transitional stage enable a 
realistic rehabilitation of the offender. In comparison to MACs, we find that the after-care 
programme which is comparable to phase two of the THPP is not as developed yet and 
doesn’t focus enough on making the connection to the community. Additionally, the THPP 
does not only comply with some of the principles of s 208 CYPF Act, like MACs, but seem 
to be built right upon every essential principle.  
One might also argue that the structure of the THPP implemented many other international 
standards of youth justice. For example: the residential facility136 of THPP is located within 
close proximity to the young person’s community, in order to strengthen family bonds and 
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keep the offender inside the community just as suggested in the Riyadh Guidelines.137 The 
first stage of the programme draws specific attention to the educating of the young offender 
what is regarded as essential in the Havana Rules of the UN.138 Phase two and three which 
involved rehabilitative and therapeutic approaches such as Multi-systematic Therapy (MST) 
and Functional family therapy (FFT)139 correspond well with the UN Havana Rules140 and 
promote the best interest of the child.141  
Generally we find that within all phases of the THPP, the personal identity and background of 
the offender is well addressed following Art. 8 UNCRC. Especially the delivery of cultural 
dimensions worked well in association with indigenous offenders that make up a large 
portion of the participants.142 Unfortunately, this exciting programme was regarded as too 
expensive to be incorporated permanently and was thus forced to close its doors.143  
 
C. Aggression Replacement Training (ART) 
 
Another interesting approach is the ART currently practised in the United States that allows 
to combine custodial orders with therapeutic measures. It provides a variety of trainings that 
teach pro-social behaviour and convince the offender that it is worth to interfere with 
negative patterns. Running for 30 hours within ten weeks, it is possible to integrate this 
training into traditional youth facilities, making custody a more valuable time for the youth 
with respect to their release.144 Its high practicability makes it a popular choice in correctional 
facilities which are often lacking alternative methods in their structure. Nonetheless, it 
involves the incarceration of the young offender and can’t be regarded as a stand-alone 
approach. Unlike the MAC programme or the THPP it relies on the functioning of other 
residential programmes and can only be used in addition to a specific concept. 
 
D. Other approaches 
 
Other programmes such as the Wilderness and Adventure camps which proliferated along 
with boot camps also appeared promising at first. These camps involved “taking out young 
offenders to remote rural or environmental locations where the clients have opportunities for 
‘routine, personal space, regular meals and positive reinforcement’.”145 Once again it 
appeared appealing to the public to see young offenders involved in outdoor activities. 
However, the programme itself was too simple in its structure and lacked therapeutic 
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components necessary to change behavioural patterns to become successful on the long run. 
Additionally they lacked any support in evaluation.146 
Related programmes, such as the Sports/Recreational Camps, where sporting and recreational 
activities are used to teach young offenders the value of team work and self-confidence, or 
the Art/Music/Cultural Camps which focuses on rehabilitating indigenous youth offenders by 
engaging them in  arts, music and cultural activities, also proposed valuable ideas.147 The 
huge benefit is that these camps offer the opportunity for the offender to continue with a 
certain sport or art/music activity after their release. Finding their way back into the 
community is made a lot easier, when they can share experiences or interests with the people 
in their community. However, we find that these components alone are not sufficient enough 
to turn the offender around and make sustainable changes to their behavioural patterns. As 
discovered beforehand, an intensive therapeutic intervention is necessary to address the 
multiple problems of young offenders who often suffer from mental health problems, 
substance abuse and are used to an environment where violence is on the daily agenda. 
Overall, it appears propitious to include elements such as sports, art and music into a 
rehabilitative programme. The complex nature of youth offending obviously requires an 
approach that is multifarious. 
VI. Conclusion 
 
In the strive for an effective treatment of New Zealand’s most persistent young offenders, 
MACs remain a controversial correctional option. But despite the troubling past of the 
concept, we can conclude that New Zealand’s MACs succeeded in offering a new concept, 
diverse to traditional boot camps. Current statistics revealed positive effects on recidivism 
rates compared to other interventions and as a result of practitioner’s non-punitive 
interpretation of the new policy they even turned out to be less punitive than originally 
intended.148 
The evaluation throughout the paper has shown that the key to fighting youth delinquency 
lies in offering small, community-based programmes which provide a fully developed 
therapeutic framework and involve the offender’s family and cultural background.149 MACs 
in New Zealand have strongly orientated their programs according to these findings. 
However, most of these elements have been found not to be essential characteristics of 
military training.150 The only “working” components associated with the Military itself were 
the structure and daily routine that was carried out during the programme. MACs in New 
Zealand appear completely stripped of their original boot camp traits so we may question if 
we need the militaristic approach at all.151 It appears that the camps could work even better if 
they would elide the Army measures and concentrate solely on the therapeutic schemes that 
are making up most of the camp structure anyhow.  
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Alternative approaches have also proven that daily routine, educational and psychological 
training can be achieved in a less hostile environment. Especially the THPP with its different 
phases seemed to have combined all the essentials necessary in the process to reduce youth 
offending. Yet we need to acknowledge that almost all alternative programmes involve high 
costs. MACs however, can be considered the financially most feasible programme in 
comparison. Obviously though, improving further on the MAC scheme as suggested, will 
involve further financial investment, consequently outweighing the cost aspect in favour of 
the camps. Generally, we will find that every efficient approach towards the most persistent 
group of young offenders will be cost-prohibitive, but it may be worthwhile to intervene at an 
early stage before this group enters into a cost-efficient adult criminal career.  
It remains to be seen which pathway New Zealand will chose in future to overcome the 
problems with this group of young offenders and if MACs will still be part of it. After all, it 
appears desirable to see New Zealand returning to its non-punitive roots approaching youth 
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